EU Competition Law in Times of Crisis:Between Present Challenges and a Largely Unwritten Future by Andreangeli, Arianna
  ISSN 1745-638X (Online) 
THE COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 
Volume 9 Issue 2 pp 91-118 July 2013 
EU Competition Law in Times of Crisis: between present challenges and a 
largely unwritten future 
Arianna Andreangeli* 
 
Since late 2007 and to this day, a broad ranging crisis has swept through a growing number of 
economic sectors.  After an initial impasse the EU Commission and other European agencies 
have adopted an increasingly proactive stance in dealing with its effects, whether in the banking 
market or in other industries.  But what has this meant for the current and foreseen directions 
of competition enforcement? This paper will address these questions by concentrating on three 
themes: first, it will consider which of its “traditional” antitrust tools the Commission has 
deployed to tackle the challenges of the crisis. Second, it will analyse the role of state aid law as 
a crisis busting tool and third, it will examine the question of whether EU merger control has 
been effective in dealing with the fallout from industrial restructuring, caused by the crisis. It 
will be concluded that despite remaining an important component of the Commission’s agenda 
and especially of its response to the economic crisis, EU competition policy seems to have 
shifted away from many “established beliefs” and tools, thus opening further questions and 
creating numerous challenges for the years to come. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since late 2007, and to this day, a broad ranging crisis has swept through a growing 
number of economic sectors; starting from the banking and financial sector, the crisis 
has affected numerous manufacturing industries and has triggered sometimes 
“convulsive” reactions by the public authorities, the economic operators and many of 
the stakeholders. According to the EU Commission the effective application of the 
competition rules is an essential tool to rebuild a fragile economy. Despite an initial 
impasse, the Commission endeavoured to adopt measures designed to “cope” with the 
impact of the crisis on the single market and to pave the way out of this predicament in 
the financial and banking industry as well as in the wider “real” economy. But what has 
this all meant for the current approaches as well as the future directions of EU 
competition enforcement? Have the merger rules and the principles governing the 
supervision over state aids provided effective tools to tackle the challenges presented by 
the crisis, without threatening the integrity of the single market? And has the 
Commission lived up to its reputation of “tough cop” when it comes to upholding the 
Union interest in the field of competition policy?  
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This paper will attempt to address some of these questions. It will touch upon three 
main themes: first of all, it will consider which of its “traditional” antitrust tools the 
Commission has deployed to tackle the challenges of the crisis. Second, the paper will 
examine the role of state aid rules in “busting” the adverse impact of the crisis. It will 
be argued that the same desire to uphold the integrity of the single market and to apply 
these principles coherently with the overarching design of a competitive and open 
economy pushed the Commission to exercise hitherto rarely invoked powers for the 
oversight of state intervention aimed at preventing threats to economic stability. 
Thereafter, the paper will examine the approach to merger control adopted by the 
Commission to deal with the restructuring of key industrial areas in response to the 
credit squeeze: it will illustrate that, after an initial impasse, which de facto allowed 
Member States to adopt unilateral decisions concerning mergers and acquisitions in key 
sectors of their economy, the Commission was able to devise and implement a 
convincing strategy in this area. At the same time, it will be suggested that the 
consequences of these mergers are still likely to present a number of challenges for ex 
post control, thus calling for a careful vigilance over “financially significant” entities. 
Finally, the paper will discuss some general issues concerning the current status of both 
competition law and of the Commission as competition watchdog. The paper will 
illustrate that the desire to maintain the integrity of the single market was especially 
apparent in the supervision of state aids and in the flexible, realistic application of the 
merger rules in specific cases, with a view to securing timely and principled clearance to 
key proposed concentrations. It will be argued that, although the Commission 
endeavoured to use existing tools flexibly and thereby maintain continuity with its long-
standing policies and consistency with key principles, the concentration arising from the 
restructuring operations occurred in a number of sectors represents a challenge for 
future competitiveness.  
The paper will conclude that competition policy remains an important component of 
the Commission’s agenda and especially of its response to the economic crisis. 
However, the need to deal with its aftershocks not just in the financial and banking 
markets, but also in the “real economy” and the demands posed by the integrity of the 
single market have thrown in question a number of “established ideas” and tools that 
had hitherto been part of “traditional” EU approaches. While it is still unclear whether 
this shift is permanent, it is undeniable that the legacy of the economic crisis for the 
competitiveness and openness of the single market is both wide-ranging and liable to 
create further challenges for the years to come. 
2. COMPETITION LAW RESPONSES TO TIMES OF CRISIS: LEAVING “OBSOLETE” 
TOOLS BEHIND? 
2.1. The EU Commission and the financial and economic crisis: a short 
summary 
The historical development of the financial crisis which unfolded from the US 
subprime mortgages’ crack and swept through large swathes of the financial and 
banking sectors throughout not just the Americas but also here in Europe has already 
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been addressed in numerous, exhaustive studies and it is not the purpose of this 
contribution to duplicate these efforts. However, it is suggested that roughly two 
phases of the crisis can be identified, which, in turn, have characterised the type of 
response adopted by the Commission. The “water-shed” moment can be identified 
with 2008, a year in which the Economic and Financial Ministers’ Committee ECOFIN 
openly recognised the “systemic” nature of the crisis, thereby paving the way for 
greater and deeper involvement of the EU institutions.1 In the first phase, i.e. the years 
2007/2008, started by the run on the British bank Northern Rock and culminating with 
the crash of Lehmann Brothers, the Commission was regarded by many as being very 
much a “witness” of unilateral measures adopted by the Member States individually in 
order to tackle the dramatic unfolding of the crisis:2 the Commission was either 
prepared to avoid interfering with the domestic authorities or was ready to examine and 
authorise mergers and other “packages” of national measures designed to deal with the 
consequences of the crisis on an “as and when” basis.3  
This “wait and see” approach,4 however, created the tangible risk of de facto allowing 
Member States, ostensibly for the sake of internal stability, to privilege “national 
champions” to the detriment of non-domestic players which may find themselves in 
similar difficulties,5 thus eventually hampering the overall competitiveness of specific 
markets, especially given the risks arising from an increase of concentration.6 It is 
undeniable that in 2007/2008 all authorities, whether at EU or at national level, were 
navigating unchartered waters in dealing with the crisis. Nonetheless, the lack of any 
precise guidelines as to how national “salvaging” operations should be conducted and 
overseen and the uncertainty as to the “aftermath” of the state-led restructuring 
prompted the EU institutions and especially the Commission, in its capacity as 
competition watchdog, to jump in the driver seat.7  
2008 was a rather momentous year, since it saw the ECOFIN ministers setting out the 
guidelines concerning emergency state intervention by Member States in the banking 
1  See e.g. Gerard, “Managing the financial crisis in Europe: why competition law is part of the solution, not of 
the problem”, (2008) Global Competition Policy, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1330326, pp. 2-4; also Mateus, “The current financial crisis and state aid in Europe”, (2009) 
5 Eur. Comp. J, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1500532, pp. 1-2.. 
2  Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 7-8. 
3  Ibid. 
4  See OFT report, 31 October 2008, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/ 
decisions/2008/LloydsTSB, para. 19; see also para. 4 ff. 
5  See Commission Press release of 13 October 2008, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 
Action.do?reference=IP/08/1496&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also 
OFT report, 31 October 2008, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/ 
2008/LloydsTSB, and Conclusions of the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, available at: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-law/competition/mergers/mergers-with-a-public-interest/ 
maintaining-the-stability-of-the-uk-financial-system; for commentary see e.g. Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 5-7. 
6  See Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 11-12. 
7  For commentary see Mateus, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 4-5; see also Weitbrecht, “Mergers in an economic crisis”, (2010) 
31(7) ECLR 276 at 278; see also p. 284. 
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and financial sectors.8 Perhaps more importantly, in 2008 there was a widespread 
recognition of the “systemic” nature of the crisis, namely of the circumstance that what 
started as a financial phenomenon, impacting on banks and other financial institutions, 
was now having ripple effects on the “real economy”. This watershed moment led to 
the Commission taking a far more “structured” and active role in responding to the 
crisis.9 The powers of state aid supervision were exercised flexibly and pragmatically, 
often in close cooperation with other Commissioners, and decisions were usually 
adopted rapidly to cope with the “timetable” of the financial markets.10 Importantly, as 
will be explored in more detail below, the Commission relied on a hitherto infrequently 
used (if at all) clause, namely Article 107(3) TFEU, to authorise aid designed to cope 
with serious economic disturbances.11 
Merger control rules were also applied in a more “creative” and flexible manner: the 
Competition Commissioner endeavoured to grant Phase I clearances rapidly, 
sometimes within 24 or 48 hours of official notification and to speed up the 
implementation of specific transactions by waiving the suspension effect following 
notification via a decision adopted according to Article 7 of the Merger Regulation.12 At 
the heart of the Commission’s renewed resolve was a desire to maintain the integrity of 
single market principles, an objective which was increasingly under threat and would 
have been even more so if the Member States had been allowed to continue “going it 
alone”: for this reason, Commissioner Kroes not only ensured swift responses to 
notifications motivated by restructuring; she also declared that her Office would use 
existing legal and economic tools to their fullest extent.13  
In light of the above, it is argued that the Commission’s role, from this “second 
season” of the crisis and onward, became central in dealing with the crisis’ demands, 
out of a concern for avoiding protectionist “torpedoes” on the part of individual 
Member States and, more generally, for maintaining the integrity of a competitive and 
open single market.14 This change was not without problems: it was often suggested 
that the Commission seemed to become more closely involved not only in the strict 
supervision but also in the outright “micro-managing” of individual Member States’ 
8  See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council held in Luxembourg on 7 October 2008 (Doc. No 13784/08); also 
Declaration on a concerted action plan of the Euro area countries, 10 October 2008, European Council of 
15/16 October 2008, Presidency Conclusions, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ 
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/103202.pdf.  
9  See Commissioner Kroes’s briefing to the ECOFIN Ministers on the financial crisis, 2 December 2008, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/757&format=HTML& 
aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
10  See e.g. Kapsis, “The impact of the recent financial crisis for EU competition policy in the banking sector”, 
(2010) 9(3) Int’l J for Trade Law and Policy 256 at 263-265. 
11  Id., pp. 264-265; see also Zimmer and Blackschocz, “The role of competition in state aid control during the 
financial market crisis”, (2011) 32(1) ECLR 9 at 10-11. 
12  See e.g. Weitbrecht, cit. (fn. 7) at 282-283. 
13  Kapsis, cit. (fn. 10), pp. 261-262; see also Zimmer et al., cit. (fn. 11), p. 14. 
14  Inter alia, see Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 8-9. 
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budgets as a condition for, for example, approval of state aid packages.15 This perceived 
change in its stance was criticised on the ground that so close supervision risked 
bypassing the democratic checks existing in individual Member States and thereby 
weakening the accountability of the institutions concerned vis-à-vis individual citizens.16  
It can therefore be concluded that the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and its 
consequences for the real economy posed great challenges for competition policy as 
well as for the whole European project of a single, open and competitive market. 
Despite initially sitting on the sidelines, the Commission became and continues to be 
closely involved in dealing with these concerns, whether in order to limit the risk that 
unilateral state action could threaten the integrity of the common market or to reassert 
the efficacy of the EU’s supra-national decision-making and implementation powers.17 
In doing so, it carefully selected the competition tools with which to structure its 
response: merger control and state aid supervision emerged as core instruments in this 
task, whereas other, more “traditional” tools for assisting restructuring, such as the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU to “crisis cartels” were not on the agenda. The next 
section will attempt to analyse the question of whether “crisis cartels” may have 
become increasingly obsolete, in the face of the almost total condemnation of cartel 
behaviour and of other forms of collusion. 
2.2. Applying Article 101(3) TFEU to restructuring deals: are crisis cartels just 
“museum material”? 
The previous section sought to provide a short sketch of the “phases” (such as they can 
be identified) in which the financial and later “systemic” crisis unfolded and to highlight 
the main traits characterising the response of the Commission to the challenges posed 
by it. It was argued that, despite initially being “reactive” to the unfolding of these 
rather dramatic circumstances, the Commission soon adopted a far more involved, 
purposeful stance to addressing the consequences of the financial crisis by relying 
mainly on state aid supervision and merger control. This section will consider whether 
the application of the legal exception to forms of coordination designed to foster 
industrial restructuring may have become “relics” of the past. 
The limited purvey of this contribution does not allow for any in-depth analysis of the 
issues arising from the practice of the Commission, mainly developed in the 1980s and 
1990s, to “exempt” prima facie anti-competitive agreements destined to deal with the 
consequences of systemic overcapacity (namely over capacity owed to the 
consequences of demand downturn and not to, e.g., inefficiencies inherent to the 
conduct of individual undertakings) from the sanction of nullity provided by Article 
101(2) TFEU.18 As is well known, there have been cases in which rivals were allowed to 
jointly agree cuts of production if the dynamics of demand and supply cannot restore 
15  Napolitano, “The two ways of global governance after the financial crisis”, (2011) 9(2) Int’l J Const’l Law 
310 at 314; see also 320-321. 
16  See e.g. Kapsis, cit. (fn. 10), pp. 269-270. 
17  For commentary, see Mateus, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 4-5; also Napolitano, cit. (fn. 15), pp. 319-320. 
18  See, inter alia, Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law: text, cases and materials, 2nd Ed., 2008: OUP, p. 807. 
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“normal” market conditions.19 Therefore, to ensure that any anti-competitive effect 
arising from the concerted output reduction would be counterbalanced by gains, in 
terms of longer term competition and efficiency increases and thereby conform to the 
Treaty requirements,20 these arrangements could only be stipulated for a transient 
period and as a response to an objective industrial downturn.21 Also, it must be shown 
that no lasting improvement can be forecast in the medium term in “normal” market 
conditions and that the cooperation does not unduly restrain the freedom of the parties 
beyond what is strictly necessary to shed the overcapacity.22  
The legal exception clause was applied by the Commission sparingly, mainly to 
“exempt” from the sanction of nullity agreements designed to attain a concerted 
reduction in production in industries characterised by “structural oversupply” (as 
opposed to overproduction owed to inefficient behaviour of the undertakings 
concerned), so that greater efficiency and more “normal” competition patterns could be 
restored within a reasonably short period of time.23  
In cases such as Synthetic Fibres and Dutch Bricks, the Commission was prepared to 
accept that a number of rivals could agree on a plan of production cuts, despite these 
arrangements constituting a very serious infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU by 
reason of their object, provided that strict requirements were met: first of all, the 
market had to be in a situation of ongoing crisis caused by factors beyond the control 
of the concerned undertakings and which could therefore only be resolved by 
concerted output reductions.24 Second, the arrangement must be limited in its duration 
and geographic scope25 and should not have been capable of totally curtailing any 
remaining competition.26 In the Commission’s view, these requirements were likely to 
be fulfilled if the arrangement preserved a certain degree of “uncertainty” as to the 
parties’ future behaviour27 and allowed them to determine autonomously key aspects of 
19  Ibid.; see also pp. 237-238. 
20  See e.g. Commission Decision 84/380/EEC, Synthetic Fibres, 4 July 1984, [1984] OJ L207/17, para. 25-27; see 
also e.g. joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73, Suiker Unie and others v Commission, [1975] 
ECR I-1663, para. 173-175; Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to 
horizontal cooperation agreements, [2001] OJ C2, para. 25; see also para. 18-19. 
21  See e.g. Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 38-41. For commentary, inter alia, WHISH, 
Competition Law, 6th Ed., 2007: OUP, p. 600. 
22  Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 38-39. See also Commission XXIII Report on 
Competition Policy, para. 85.  
23  Ibid. See also Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 82 and 89; Commission Notice, 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, [2001] OJ C2, 
para. 73-75, 84. For commentary, see inter alia, FIEBIG, “European crisis cartels and the triumph of 
industrial policy over competition in Europe”, (1999) 25 Brook. J Int’l L 607 at 614-615. 
24  See e.g. Commission decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984—Synthetic Fibres (IV/30.810), [1984] OJ L207/17, 
para. 28-29; see also para. 31-35. 
25  Inter alia, Commission decision 94/296/ECof 29 April 1994—Stichting Baaksten (IV/34.456), [1994] OJ 
L131/15, para. 32-34. 
26  Id., para. 39-40. See also, mutatis mutandis, Commission decision 87/3/EEC of 4 December 1986—
ENI/Montedison (IV/31.055), [1987] OJ L5/13, especially paras. 7-8, 21-22, 33-35. 
27  Id., para. 34-35; see also Commission decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984—Synthetic Fibres (IV/30.810), 
[1984] OJ L207/17, para. 31-32, 34-37. 
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their commercial policies.28 Thus, although the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to 
mutually agreed output reductions was met with concern by some commentators, on 
the ground that it could have resulted in an excessively wide reading of the “efficiency 
gains” condition and in particular in incorporating “non-economic” elements in this 
analysis,29 it has since been considered as an “acceptable” use of the legal exception.30  
It may have been thought that, with the advent of the financial crisis, Article 101(3) 
TFEU could have provided a flexible and overall effective instrument to cope with the 
aftershocks of the “credit squeeze”, especially when the latter started to adversely affect 
the “real economy”. However, it is apparent that no decisions such as the one in Dutch 
Bricks were adopted. How can this apparent “gap” be explained? It is unquestionable 
that over the past 20 years a clear condemnation of cartel behaviour has been inspiring 
the enforcement activity of the Commission, as well as justifying the closer and more 
active involvement of the national competition agencies: this is especially visible in the 
multiplication of leniency programmes across the Union, a phenomenon which in turn 
has resulted in a far more incisive detection activity, in higher fines and even in criminal 
sanctions in some Member States. Furthermore, the more recent case law of the Court 
of Justice, concerning the application of Article 101(1) TFEU to similar “emergency” 
arrangements can be read as confirming a very “orthodox” view of the prohibition 
clause, as a result of which “serious infringements” will be condemned outright as 
restrictions ‘by object’,31 with a very limited possibility of “redemption” under Article 
101(3) TFEU.32 Consequently, while “agreeing their way out of recession” may have 
seemed an attractive option, the current position shows that a “less controversial” way 
of dealing with industrial downturn would be for each rival to adopt unilaterally 
decisions as to its rationalisation.33  
It is concluded that while Article 101(3) provides in principle a framework within which 
the positive effects of prima facie anti-competitive arrangements, including public 
policy objectives, can be assessed with a view to waiving the sanction of nullity of 
Article 101(2), it may not provide a suitable answer to the need to deal with the effects 
of the economic downturn in Europe.34 The almost unanimous condemnation of cartel 
behaviour and consequently the more general distrust for any form of collusion having 
28  Id., para. 51-52; see also Commission decision 94/296/ECof 29 April 1994—Stichting Baaksten (IV/34.456), 
[1994] OJ L131/15, para. 33, 35-36. 
29  See e.g. Fiebig, “European crisis cartels and the triumph of industrial policy over competition in Europe”, 
(1999) 25 Brook. J Int’l L 607 at 619; see also pp. 636-637; also Hornsby, “Competition policy in the 80s: 
more policy less competition?”, (1987) 12(2) ELRev 79.  
30  Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, [1994] ECR II-595, para. 85, 109-110; see also, mutatis mutandis, 
case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1, para. 5; for commentary, see e.g. Townley, Article 
81 EC and public policy, 2009: Oxford, Hart Publishing, p. 255. 
31  Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers, [2008] ECR I-8637 
(hereinafter referred to also as Barry Brothers), especially para. 33-37. 
32  For commentary, see inter alia Van der Vijver, “The Irish beef case”, (2009) 30(4) ECLR 198; also Svetlicinii, 
“ECJ’s ruling in beef industry case: competition law must be observed at all times”, (2008) 12 Eur. L. Reporter 
402; Andreangeli, “From mobile phones to cattle”, (2011) 34 W Comp 215 at 223-224. 
33  See inter alia Andreangeli, cit. (fn. 32), pp. 221-222. 
34  Townley, cit. (fn 30), p. 302. 
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appreciably restrictive effects on competition support the view that allowing rivals to 
“agree their way out of a crisis” is no longer an appropriate competition policy tool to 
deal with the effects of the credit squeeze on the “real economy”, and could therefore 
explain the preference of the Commission for other tools, such as state aid oversight 
and the application of the merger control rules. The next section will analyse the 
approach adopted by the Commission in these areas with a view to assessing the overall 
effectiveness of its role of “guardian of the single market” albeit in challenging times. 
3. NEW CHALLENGES, NEW RESPONSES? ADAPTING THE EXISTING 
“TOOLBOX” TO THE DEMANDS OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
3.1. State aids in times of crisis: “rescue and restructuring” banks and beyond 
The previous section analysed briefly the question of whether Article 101 TFEU and 
especially the legal exception provided by its paragraph 3 can provide tools to tackle the 
consequences of the economic crisis and in that context questioned the continued 
suitability of “crisis cartels” as tools to deal with economically challenges times. This 
section will instead be concerned with addressing the questions arising from the 
application of state aid rules to the rescue and restructuring of undertakings in crisis, 
not just in the financial sector, but also in the “real economy”. As is well known, the 
EU Treaty provides a framework for the overseeing the involvement of the Member 
States in the economy and more specifically for preventing the granting of public aid 
that may distort competition within the single market.35  
According to Article 107(1) TFEU, any form of state assistance which may favour 
specific undertaking or the production of certain goods or services, thereby adversely 
affecting, actually or potentially, competition on the common market, is incompatible 
with the rules of the Treaty and therefore prohibited.36 Article 108(3) imposes a duty 
on the notifying Member State to abstain from giving effect to the aid until such time 
as the procedure designed for its control has been completed.37 This procedure is 
articulated in a “preliminary” examination, to be completed within two months, at the 
end of which the Commission may decide that either the assistance does not constitute 
“aid” within the meaning of the Treaty, or that it does not appear to be anti-
competitive. In any other case, the Commission will initiate a formal procedure, 
entailing a full examination of the proposed measure, and assisted by inter partes 
procedural guarantees.38  
As to the assessment of the aid, the case law indicates that the Commission enjoys a 
certain degree of discretion when approving aid under Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU.39 
35  See e.g. Hancher et al., EC State Aids, 2006; Iversen et al. (Eds), Regulating competition in the EU, 2008, see 
especially chapter IX. 
36  See inter alia Jessen, “State Aid”, in Iversen et al., cit. (fn. 35), pp. 402-404. 
37  See inter alia, case 120/73, [1973] ECR 1471, para. 8; for commentary, Jessen, cit. (fn. 36), pp. 421-422. 
38  Inter alia, Jessen, cit. (fn. 36), pp. 409 ff. 
39  See inter alia, case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, [2001] ECR I-8365, para. 30-31. 
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It will not take into account the “intention of the parties”, i.e. whether the state, in 
granting the aid, pursued deliberately the goal of giving “targeted” financial assistance 
to the recipient40 or whether the assistance pursued public policy goals.41 What is, 
instead relevant is the extent to which any form of financial assistance is such that it 
favours the recipient by conferring to her advantages that she could not have obtained 
according to normal market conditions.42 At the heart of this assessment is the 
“ordinary investor” concept, according to which financial support only constitutes aid 
if the terms under which it is granted by a public body would not be acceptable for a 
private entity operating within the free market.43  
If these conditions are met, aid will be considered contrary to the Treaty if it is 
“selective”, i.e. if it favours the recipient vis-à-vis other entities that are in a comparable 
position, thus conferring to the former a competitive advantage44 by “mitigating the 
charges that are normally included in the budget of an undertaking” and putting it in a 
more favourable financial position than non-recipients.45 By contrast, financial 
advantages stemming from the implementation of “general schemes” will not be 
regarded as aid that can distort competition, provided that they are “open to all 
economic agents” and operated in accordance with “proper objective criteria”.46 In this 
context, the manner in which the individual measures were construed and in particular 
the extent to which they result in specific undertakings or economic sectors being 
favoured will be especially important.47  
As to whether aid is capable of distorting rivalry on the market or it threatens to do so, 
the Court of Justice held in Commission v Italy that this assessment must be conducted so 
as to prevent Member States from favouring certain undertakings or the supply of 
specific goods or services and thereby seeking to interfere with the “normal” 
functioning of competition within the common market.48 Central is the question of 
whether the financial assistance could reduce the ability of rivals to the recipient to 
expand their position on the market or new rivals to attempt to enter the market.49 For 
this purpose, the Commission will have to conduct a counterfactual analysis, by 
comparing the conditions of competition that characterised the relevant market before 
to those occurring after the aid was granted.50  
40  See inter alia Commission Decision 92/11/EC, Toyota, [1992] OJ L6/36, Part IV. 
41  Case C-241/94, France v Commission, [1996] ECR I-4551, para. 19-21. 
42  See e.g. case C-126/01, Gemo SA, [2003] ECR I-13769, para. 28-33. 
43  See inter alia case C-39/94, SFEI V La Poste, [1996] ECR I-3547, para. 62. 
44  See e.g. case C-143/99, cit. (fn. 39), para. 35-36. 
45  Case C-6/97, Italy v Commission, [1999] ECR I-2981, para. 15-16. 
46  Jessen, cit. (fn. 36), p. 448; see e.g. Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to direct 
business taxation, [1998] OJ C384/3, para. 13-14. 
47  See inter alia, case C-143/99, cit. (fn. 39), para. 41; also case C-88/03, Portugal v Commission, [2006] ECR I-
7115, para. 54-56. 
48  Case 173/73, [1974] ECR 709, para. 13. 
49  See inter alia case C-169/08, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna, [2009] ECR I-10821, para. 61-
63. 
50  See inter alia case C-6/97, cit. (fn. 45), para. 21-23. 
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According to Article 107(2) TFEU, some forms of aid are compatible with the Treaty, 
such as certain forms of financial assistance targeted at social objectives. Under this 
provision the Commission enjoys very limited powers of appreciation, being able only 
to scrutinise the notified measures to ensure that they meet the criteria provided by the 
Treaty and are not disproportionate to the goals they seek to achieve or contrary to the 
general principles of EU law or other rules of the Treaty.51 Article 107(3) provides a 
further basis for approval of notified aid aimed at supporting “development of certain 
regions or certain areas of the economy”, at allowing the realisation of “projects of 
common European interest” and at preserving and promoting culture.52 The 
Commission may also authorise aid that is necessary to prevent and limit the impact of 
a “serious disturbance” in the European economy. Unlike under Article 107(2) TFEU, 
however, the Commission enjoys wide discretion in examining the impact of the aid on 
competition and the extent to which any distortion, whether actual or threatened, is 
limited to what is indispensable to achieve the aim pursued by the notifying Member 
State.53  
The role and scope of state aid control has evolved overtime, to respond to the 
changing economic conditions across the EU and to the challenges posed by 
globalisation and by the ensuing need, expressed in 2000 with the Lisbon strategy, to 
secure efficiency, openness and competitiveness of the European economy.54 Member 
States were therefore resolved to reduce the scope of their intervention in the economy 
and to destine public resources to “more horizontal objectives of common interest” as 
well as the call for a stricter scrutiny of notified aid.55 As a result, the Commission’s 
approach to the scrutiny of aid tended to privilege financial assistance destined to 
support, inter alia, innovation as well as boosting the activity of small and medium sized 
enterprises.56 The Commission also sought to identify more “virtuous” forms of aid by 
means of Notices and Guidelines and of Block Exemption Regulations.57  
The implementation of the Lisbon Strategy had also a significant impact on the 
approach to aid destined to facilitating the “rescuing and restructuring of firms in 
difficulty”.58 Perceived as distortive by the Commission, on the ground that it could be 
used to “prop up” artificially inherently “inefficient” competitors, to the detriment of 
more “virtuous” market players, this form of financial assistance was strictly limited to 
51  Article 108 TFEU; see Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999, [1999] OJ L83/1; also 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC)No 
659/1999, [2004] L140/1. For commentary see e.g. Jessen, cit. (fn. 36), pp. 470-471. 
52  Id., p. 471. 
53  Ibid.; see also Commission Guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, [2004] OJ 
L244/2, para. 6-7. 
54  Id., para. 3. 
55  Ibid. 
56  See e.g. Community framework for state aid for research and development and innovation, [2006] OJ 
C323/1; also Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, [2004] L124/36; see also Guidelines on Rescue and Restructuring, para. 57 ff. 
57  Inter alia Jessen, cit. (fn. 36), pp. 465-468. 
58  See Guidelines, cit. (fn. 53), para. 2-3. 
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“exceptional” cases.59 Thus, the 2004 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines sought to 
achieve greater competitiveness in the EU economy and to respond to the need to limit 
the intervention of the Member States only to cases in which aid was truly “the only 
way out of a crisis” for undertakings which it can be demonstrated are capable of 
returning to long term viability within a reasonably short term.60 The Commission had 
to be satisfied that State assistance was aimed at a “firm in difficulty”, i.e. an 
undertaking that is unable to “stem losses which, without outside intervention (...) 
[would] almost certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium 
term”.61 Whereas “rescue aid” is “by nature temporary and reversible” and limited to 
“keeping the firm afloat” for the time required to work out a restructuring strategy or a 
plan for liquidation,62 “restructuring aid” is inherently of a “longer term nature” and is 
authorised only if it is accompanied by a “feasible, coherent and far-reaching plan” 
destined to bring the firm “back in business and to allow it to operate without 
support.63  
To deserve approval rescue aid must consist of “liquidity support” such as loans or 
guarantees granted at an interest rate that would normally be charged to “sound” 
enterprises and be justified on the grounds of “serious social difficulties”, as well as 
being unable to adversely affect competition in other Member States to a significant 
extent; it should also be repaid within six months of the first instalment being paid to 
the recipient and its amount should also be strictly limited to what is necessary “to keep 
the firm in business” for the required period.64 In addition, the Member State 
concerned is obliged to provide, within the same six month period, the Commission 
with a “restructuring or a liquidation plan or proof that the loan has been reimbursed in 
full” or that the guarantees have been terminated by the same deadline.65 
The approach to “restructuring aid” is, instead, more complex: according to the 
Guidelines, aid will only be authorised once in ten years and if the notification is 
accompanied by a restructuring plan detailing “appropriate” measures destined to bring 
the firm back to operating viably on the market within the shortest time possible.66 In 
addition “compensatory measures”, such as, inter alia, the divestiture of assets or 
reductions of capacity or of its market share must be adopted in order to ensure that 
any distortions of competition are kept to a minimum and that in particular “the 
positive effects outweigh the negative ones”.67 The aid recipient is also obliged to make 
a “significant own contribution” to the restructuring costs (50% at a minimum),68 
59  See e.g. Soltesz et al., “The “temporary framework”--the Commission’s response to crisis in the real 
economy”, (2010) ECLR 106 at 107-108; also Guidelines, cit. (fn. 53), para. 4. 
60  Inter alia, Stoltesz, cit. (fn. 59), pp. 107-108. 
61  Guidelines, cit. (fn. 53), para. 15. 
62  Ibid.; see also, inter alia, Stoltesz, cit. (fn. 59), pp. 108-109. 
63  Guidelines, cit. (fn. 53), para. 17. 
64  Id., para. 25. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Id., para. 35. 
67  Id., para. 37. 
68  Id., para. 44. 
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destined to minimise the distortion of competition arising from the competitive 
advantage gained by the recipient,69 and to accept often pervasive limits to its business 
freedom, such as the obligation to divest key assets and to decrease its presence on the 
market.70 
After initially adopting a “spectator” position vis-à-vis the developments of the 
financial crisis, the Commission sought to intervene more actively in managing its 
consequences. Following the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and leading up and 
including the fall of the investment bank Lehmann Brothers, the Commission allowed 
several Member States to take direct action to rescue banks and financial institutions, 
ranging from the grant of guarantees and loans for recapitalisation to the outright 
nationalisation of some of the most distressed institutions. Thus, for instance, in the 
Northern Rock/Bank of England case the Commission de facto avoided adopting a 
decision on the liquidity line granted by the UK central bank to the financial institution 
Northern Rock on the ground that this type of financial assistance did not constitute 
“aid” within the meaning of the Treaty.71 The Commission took the view that since 
Northern Rock was still able to meet its liabilities at the time in which the line was 
granted and the latter had been provided at the Bank of England’s own initiative, this 
measure did not trigger the application of Article 107 TFEU:72 it was emphasised that, 
in any event, the grant of this short term credit facility had been backed by “high 
quality” guarantee and was accompanied by the obligation on the part of the recipient 
to pay “punitive interest rates”.73  
However, the initially “conservative approach”, characterised by the application of the 
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, was replaced by a far more proactive attitude to 
dealing with the consequences of the crisis. The “turning point” was represented by the 
conclusions adopted by the ECOFIN ministers on 7 October 2008.74 At that meeting it 
was agreed that state financial “interventions should be timely” and of limited duration; 
Member States should remain “watchful regarding the interests of taxpayers” as well as 
capable of determining a change in management; and shareholders of institutions in 
crisis should “bear the due consequences of the intervention”.75 Overall, it was 
recognised that the crisis had become “systemic”, i.e. had become capable of not only 
leading to the downfall of “unstable” banks, but also to adversely affect “fundamentally 
sound” financial institutions.76 At the same time, however, the Ministers expressed the 
view that any aid targeted at supporting failing banks should be inspired by “common 
EU principles” of openness and non-discrimination.77 Thus on 13 October 2008 the 
69  Inter alia, Stoltesz, cit. (fn. 59), pp. 107-108. 
70  Id., p. 108; see especially Guidelines, cit. (fn,. 53), para. 45-46. 
71  Commission communication of 5 December 2007, COM(2007) 6217. 
72  Id., para. 30-33. 
73  Ibid.; for commentary, see e.g. Gilliams, “Stress testing the regulator”, (2011) 36(1) ELRev 3 at p. 5-6. 
74  See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/103202.pdf.  
75  Id., p. 2. 
76  Ibid. See also, inter alia, Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 8-9; also Zimmer et al., cit. (fn. 11), pp. 9-10.  
77  Id., pp. 2-3. 
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Commission issued a Communication concerning the application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global 
financial crisis (hereinafter referred to as the Banking Communication).78  
The framework proposed in the Banking Communication was expressly regarded as a 
derogation from the generally applicable Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and the 
powers of assessment exercised by the Commission in this specific respect were based 
on Article 107(3)(b), i.e. on the provision conferring on the Commission the power to 
assess and approve aid destined to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State”.79 According to the Communication, this requirement had been fulfilled 
due to the nature of the crisis and in particular to the real and grave danger that the 
overall financial system of the EU Members could be jeopardised as a result of the 
credit squeeze.80 
Several commentators emphasised that this legal basis entailed a rather wide power of 
appreciation in examining individual aid proposals and consequently had been relied 
upon by the Commission to depart from its general approach, enshrined in the 2004 
R&R Guidelines, for the purpose of meeting the goals and expectations set at the 2008 
ECOFIN Council Meeting.81 As a result, it could adopt decisions in accordance with a 
more flexible set of criteria and “wave through” those forms of financial aid that aimed 
at attaining goals going “beyond competition”, such as the “restoration of long term 
profitability” of a hitherto “troubled” bank,82 thereby limiting the adverse 
consequences of the current financial disturbance.83 At the same time, however, the 
Commission was profoundly conscious of the need to carefully “calibrate” the scope of 
its policy and therefore to limit clearance only to forms of financial intervention 
granted only in “genuinely exceptional circumstances”, i.e. when the financial instability 
of one institution would threaten the “entire functioning of the financial markets”.84 
The Commission was especially concerned with preventing individual member states 
from relying on the “serious financial disturbance” ground to “prop up” national 
champions.85  
Before the downfall of Lehmann Brothers the Commission, reluctant to accept that the 
overall banking sector within a Member State could be threatened by the crisis 
engulfing a single institution,86 had been slow to authorise under Article 107(3)(b) 
financial assistance targeted at a specific bank, preferring, instead, to apply the rather 
78  [2008] OJ C270/8. 
79  Id., para.4, 6-7. 
80  Id., para. 8. 
81  Id., para. 3; see also para. 10. 
82  Zimmer et al., cit. (fn. 11), p. 114-115. 
83  Banking Communication, cit. (fn. 71), para. 10; see also para. 13. 
84  See id., para. 11. 
85  Inter alia, Gilliams, cit. (fn. 73), p. 5-6. 
86  See inter alia, Commission decision of 27 June 2007, BAWAG, COM(2007) 3038 final, especially para. 168-
170. 
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restrictive standards laid down in the general R&R Guidelines.87 However, the 2008 
events showed that even the instability of one operator could provoke bank runs and, 
more generally, undermine the overall solidity of the banking sector within the 
notifying Member State.88 For these reasons, the Commission sought to interpret many 
of the principles guiding its supervision of ‘rescue and restructuring’ aid more flexibly 
so that they could adapt better to the demands of the crisis.  
This new approach was made manifest by the 2008 Banking Communication:89 
according to this new instrument any emergency measures of financial assistance could 
be authorised if the Commission was satisfied that they were capable of tackling 
effectively the consequences of the “credit squeeze” for the stability of the overall 
economy of a specific Member State.90 “Aid schemes”, accessible by all institutions “in 
crisis” that fulfilled certain objective and non-discriminatory criteria were preferable to 
“individual aid measures” which, given their ability to distort competition in favour of 
the recipients in a more glaring way, would be subject to closer scrutiny.91 Both forms 
of assistance had to satisfy criteria of ‘appropriateness’ and of ‘proportionality’ and 
could only be allowed if they were of limited duration and strictly monitored.92   
As to the eligibility for this type of aid, the Commission drew a distinction between 
“illiquid but otherwise financially sound” undertakings and those institutions who were 
“troubled” due to “endogenous” factors. In respect to the former, it was held that since 
their instability was owed to the impact of the present circumstances on their 
management, rather than to, e.g. “excessive risk taking”, any distortion of competition 
likely to follow from the grant of aid would have been limited and the scope of the 
intervention itself would have been narrower.93 By contrast, granting financial 
assistance to banks or financial institutions who were experiencing turmoil due to 
“poor management” or “reckless choices” in respect to assets would have required a far 
more careful examination, due to their greater intensity and, consequently to the greater 
likelihood that they would result in significant distortion of competition.94 
Furthermore, the notifying state would remain obliged to provide a “restructuring 
plan”, whose approval is subject to the existence of appropriate compensatory 
measures and to the giving of a suitable and proportionate “own contribution”.95  
In order to be approved, notified aid should be “well-targeted”, that is, capable of 
effectively address a serious economic disturbance; it should be “proportionate” to the 
objective being sought and “not going beyond what is required” to achieve this goal; 
and finally, it should be “designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill-over 
87  Id., para. 171 ff.; for commentary, see Gilliams, cit. (fn. 73), pp. 7-8. 
88  Gilliams, cit. (fn. 73), p. 8 ff. 
89  Commission decision of 5 November 2008, COM(2008) 6498; see especially para. 54 ff. 
90  Id., para. 11. 
91  Id., para. 9-10. 
92  Id., para. 12-13. 
93  Id., para. 14. 
94  Ibid.; for commentary, inter alia, Zimmer et al. (fn. 11), p. 15. 
95  Id., para. 14-15; see e.g. Zimmer et al., cit. (fn. 11), pp. 11-12. 
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effects” on rivals, other economic areas or other Member States.96 Access to financial 
assistance, in whatever form, approved under the 2008 Communication should be 
determined in light of objective and non-discriminatory criteria and be available to both 
institutions incorporated in the territory of the Member State concerned and 
institutions which have “significant activities” therein.97 These guarantees should only 
cover certain types of liabilities, such as, inter alia, retail deposits, and “ensure an 
adequate private sector contribution from the beneficiaries and/or the sector” to its 
costs, in the form of “adequate remuneration”98 to avoid “generating moral hazard” 
and thereby aggravate the crisis itself.99  
Financial assistance should be limited to a minimum and be granted for a limited period 
of time, although, in derogation from the R&R guidelines, there is no fixed deadline of 
6 months for repayment, and subjected to review at least every six months.100 Finally, 
to avoid or at least minimize any distortion of competition resulting from the aid, the 
latter must entail the imposition of “appropriate mechanisms to minimise … the 
potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries” and also limiting the risk 
of moral hazard.101 These “safeguards” can entail behavioural constraints, aimed 
especially at preventing aggressive expansion by the beneficiary, the introduction of 
limits as to the latter’s market share or presence in the industry or as to its ability to 
engage in “advertising invoking the guaranteed status” or the “prohibition of conduct 
… irreconcilable with the purpose” of the assistance, such as, e.g., issuing new “stock 
options for management”.102  
The Banking Communication was followed by a number of Guidelines dealing with 
specific forms of aid to financial institutions, ranging from recapitalisation to the 
management of “impaired assets”.103 These documents are destined to supplement the 
discipline contained in the Banking Communication and, in that context, provide 
additional requirements for the purpose of obtaining the authorisation of notified aid: 
for instance, the 2009 Restructuring Communication makes clear that the notifying 
Member States must provide a “viability report” in order to demonstrate that, through 
the provision of the aid, the bank will be restored to long-term ability to conduct safely 
its business.104  
96  Banking Communication, cit. (fn. 71), para. 15. 
97  Id., para. 18; see also para. 35 and 37 for recapitalisation schemes. 
98  Id., para. 26, see also para. 38 for recapitalisation schemes. 
99  Id., para. 19-20. 
100  Id., para. 24. 
101  Id., para. 27; see also para. 39 for recapitalisation schemes. 
102  Id., para. 29. 
103  See Commission Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, 
[2008] OJ C10/2; also Commission communication on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community 
banking sector, [2009] OJ C72/1; for commentary, see inter alia Kapsis, “The impact of the recent financial 
crisis on EU competition policy for the banking sector”, (2010) J Int’s Trade L and Pol. 256 at 264-265. 
104  Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules, [2009] OJ 195/4, see especially para. 55 ff. 
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The new “post-Lehmann” approach was made apparent in the Roskilde decision,105 
which was adopted shortly after the Banking Communication: the Commission 
approved the financial assistance on the ground of its being designed to avert the 
financial instability stemming from the winding down of the Roskilde Bank.106 The aid 
was also of very limited duration and had been subjected to several conditions as to the 
applicable regime for the liquidation of the institution.107 The importance of having 
clear, binding and detailed restructuring plans was also clear in the Aegon decision. The 
Commission took the view that the “viability report” should explain the weaknesses 
and the difficulties characterising the aid recipient,108 illustrate the measures being 
proposed to address them and show how the recipient is going to return to long term 
viability, i.e. capable of meeting its liabilities and secure an “adequate” return on 
capital.109  
The relatively more flexible and quicker, yet still scrupulous attitude to the assessment 
of aid to financial institution was especially apparent in the decision approving the 
United Kingdom’s package of assistance measures designed to support its banking 
sector.110 In 2008 the Chancellor of the Exchequer had waved through the merger 
between HBoS and Lloyds TSB on the basis of the “public interest”, thus preventing 
the OFT, that had found that this takeover had given rise to a relevant merger situation, 
from referring it to the Competition Commission.111  
In 2008 the Commission approved a guarantee and recapitalisation scheme, backed by 
the British Government on the ground that the critical state of the British banking 
industry had the potential of destabilising the whole British economy.112 It took the 
view that the scheme was of limited scope, since it had been made available to all the 
“solvent” undertakings whose stability had been endangered by the decrease in liquidity 
within the system, and of short duration;113 consequently, it was concluded that the 
assistance conformed to the criteria of “appropriateness”, “necessity and 
proportionality” laid down in the 2008 Communication.114 On that basis, the British 
Exchequer was allowed to support the new merged entity by granting it access to the 
Asset Protection Scheme: under the scheme the Government underwrote part of the 
105  Commission decision of 5 November 2008, COM(2008) 6498, see especially para. 54 ff. 
106  See id., para. 73-75. 
107  Id., para. 76. 
108  Commission decision of 17 August 2010, COM(2010) 5740, para. 98. 
109  Id., para. 97; see also para. 99.  
110  See Commission press release of 13 October 2008, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
1496_en.htm?locale=en; see also Conclusions of the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
abvailable at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file48745.pdf; for commentary, see e.g. Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 5-
7. 
111  See OFT report of 31 October 2008, available at: http://oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/ 
2008/LloydsTSB#.UP1r4LqPdBk.  
112  See Press release of 13 October 2008, IP/08/1486; decision N507/2008, C(2009) 6058, para. 36-37; see also 
para. 40-41. 
113  Id., para. 45 ff.  
114  Id., para. 68-70. 
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Lloyds Banking Group’s losses caused by the takeover, with a view to issuing new 
shares.115 The recipient on its part made a significant own contribution to the 
restructuring costs and also accepted to divest key assets at a later date.116  
Eventually, the “impaired asset relief measure” was approved, together with a 
restructuring plan, in December 2009:117 the Commission took the view that thanks to 
the assistance provided by the British Treasury, the recipient could have returned to 
long term viability as well as reacquired the confidence of the markets, by “shedding” 
the riskiest assets and upholding “good management” practices.118 It was emphasised 
that, both to avoid moral hazard and limiting undue distortions of competition, the 
recipient would undertake to contribute significantly to the value of the aid and also to 
divest key elements of its most profitable businesses.119 
Similar concerns also guided the Commission’s decision in respect to the joint 
guarantee scheme granted by Luxembourg, Belgium and France in order to support the 
stability of Dexia, another financial institution active in the banking and insurance 
markets: Dexia was heavily exposed on the stock market and held risky assets which in 
turn, due to the impact of the financial crisis, could jeopardise its stability and thereby 
creating a serious systemic risk for the whole market.120 In November 2008 the 
Commission approved the provision of the joint guarantee on the ground that the 
notified financial assistance would facilitate Dexia in accessing the finance required to 
reinforce its stability and thereby restore confidence of the market and of consumers in 
the recipient’s viability;121 it would also be limited in time and scope and remunerated 
on the basis of an interest rate determined in light of the ECB’s recommendations, thus 
complying with requirements of necessity and proportionality.122 Importantly, the aid to 
Dexia was approved very swiftly for an initial six-month period, subject to continuous 
supervision and, if the requirements in question continued to be complied with, to the 
submission of a restructuring plan securing the bank’s return to long term viability.123 
Full approval of the guarantee was eventually obtained, subject to conditions, in March 
2009.124 
It is suggested that the framework made up of the 2008 Banking Communication and 
of its “supplementary” Notices are designed to allow the Commission to reconcile the 
integrity of the Common Market principles with the demands of managing the 
115  See especially decision N428/2009, 14 December 2009; see also Press Release IP/09/1728. 
116  See Press Release IP/09/1728 of 18 November 2009. 
117  See Press release IP/09/1915; Commission decision N422/2009 and N621/2009, of 14 December 2009. 
118  Commission decision N621/2009, para. 148 ff. 
119  Id., para.153 ff. 
120  See Press Release IP/08/1745. Commission Decision of 19 November 2008, case NN45/4008, COM(2008) 
7388; see especially para. 36 to 44. 
121  Id., para. 60-65. 
122  Id., para. 68 ff.; see especially para. 71-72. 
123  See inter alia Press Release IP/08/1745; also Decision, cit. (fn. 120), para. 77-78. 
124  Commission Decision, case C9/09, of 19 March 2009, COM(2009) 1960, see especially para. 77-79. 
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aftershocks of the financial crisis in Europe.125 Strict limits as to the duration of the 
assistance, the application of clear and non-discriminatory eligibility criteria and the 
obligation to make adequate “own contributions” to restructuring costs all concurred to 
limiting the scope of the competitive advantage that the recipients would otherwise 
enjoy and in particular to ensuring that no “national champions” would emerge.126  
It is however clear that the Banking Communication carved a number of exceptions to 
the approach generally applicable to rescue and restructuring operations and enshrined 
in the 2004 Guidelines: first of all, the framework established in the 2008 document is 
applicable not just to “failing” institutions which may require “rescue aid”, but also to 
banks which were “fundamentally sound but illiquid”, due to factors beyond their 
control.127 A second derogation concerns the nature of the aid which must be 
“temporary and reversible” will be authorised; by contrast, the 2008 Communication 
envisages that rescue aid aimed at banks through recapitalisation, which is by its own 
nature irreversible, will be amenable to authorisation.128 And thirdly, the “once in ten 
years” limit is not applicable to aid to financial institutions.129 
In respect to aid targeted at “fundamentally sound but illiquid” undertakings, it is 
further provided that these recipients, even when they benefit from aid aimed at their 
recapitalisation, are not obliged to provide the Commission with a “restructuring plan” 
or with a plan on the implementation of the notified measures; however they remain 
obliged to submit a plan detailing how they are proposing to meet their long-term 
financing needs.130 
In addition, the circumstance that “compensatory measures” are imposed on all 
beneficiaries and for that purpose are “tailor-made to address the distortions identified 
on the markets” contribute to ensuring that a “level playing field” across the relevant 
market is maintained for the medium- and long-term.131 The 2008 Banking 
Communication was accompanied by a number of administrative “adjustments” to the 
scrutiny and approval procedure and in particular by an express commitment of the 
Commission to examine notified measures as quickly as possible, and preferably within 
24 hours of submission.132 
It is concluded that the Commission succeeded in dealing with the consequences of the 
financial crisis while at the same time addressing the demands of having to maintain the 
integrity of the single market.133 Guided by “smart pragmatism”, the 2008 Banking 
125  See e.g. Zimmer et al., cit. (fn 11), pp. 12-13. 
126  Kapsis, cit. (fn. 10), p. 265. 
127  Banking Communication, cit. (fn. 100), para. 13; for commentary see Gilliams, cit. (fn. 73), p. 11. 
128  Gilliams, cit. (fn. 73), p. 12. 
129  Id., p. 13. 
130  Id., p. 16; for commentary see Kapsis, cit. (fn. 10), p. 265. 
131  Id., p. 20. 
132  See e.g. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1495&format=HTML&aged=0 
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
133 See e.g. Gilliams, cit. (fn. 73), p. 7-10; see also p. 24-25. 
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Communication deployed the existing state aid supervision standards in a more flexible, 
speedier and thus more responsive way. The circumstance that these decisions were 
hardly ever challenged can be read as demonstrating that this approach represented a 
“fair and balanced” deal for both banks and Member States. The next section will move 
on to deal with the effects of the “credit squeeze” on the real economy and will analyse 
the Commission’s response to these challenges.134 
3.2. The financial crisis and the “real economy”: the “Temporary Framework” 
for “real” enterprises affected by the credit squeeze 
The previous section provided a brief analysis of the approach adopted by the 
Commission in respect to state aid granted to banks and emphasised how, at the heart 
of these efforts, was a concern for reconciling the need to take swift action in order to 
tackle the adverse effects of the crisis with the integrity of the single market. However, 
the Banking Communication only dealt with the serious disturbances, whether actual or 
potential, arising from the instability of financial institutions; it did not, therefore, lay 
down any measures designed to tackle the “aftershocks” of the crisis for enterprises 
operating in the “real economy”, i.e. those undertakings that ran non-financial activities 
and which required access to credit for the purpose of financing their commercial 
ventures.  
Especially after the downfall of Lehmann Brothers it became clear that the financial 
crisis had become “systemic”, in the sense of, inter alia, having spread to the “real 
economy”.135 To respond to these challenges, the Commission, once again, derogated 
from its “traditional” approach to state aid, enshrined in the R&R Guidelines, with a 
view to providing a temporary “lifeline” to those undertakings which, despite being 
fundamentally solid, are faced with serious challenges to their viability due to the scarce 
availability of credit. The Temporary Framework Notice, issued in January 2009 and 
originally in force only until the end of 2010, stated that financial assistance targeted at 
undertakings that find it difficult to access finance through the “normal channels” will 
be authorised under Article 107(3)(b) if it meets certain criteria relating to the type of 
assistance, the state of the recipient and the conditions at which the aid is granted.  
It is clear from the Communication that the Commission was especially concerned with 
avoiding that the Temporary Framework could be used to circumvent the limits of the 
R&R Guidelines and in particular could be applied in a way that defeated the objectives 
and the key principles of the single market, especially by encouraging a “subsidy race” 
among Member States.136 As a result, the Commission was particularly vigilant in 
assessing the measures proposed by the German government to support the stability 
and restore the long term viability of Opel in 2009137 by rejecting any conditions that 
134  Commission Communication on the Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to support access 
to finance in the current financial and economic crisis, [2011] C6/5. 
135  Commission Communication on a Temporary Union Framework for State aid measures to support access to 
finance in the current financial and economic crisis, [2011] OJ C6/5, para. 1.1. 
136  See id., especially para. 1.2; for commentary, see Soltesz et al., cit. (fn. 59), pp. 108-109. 
137  See inter alia Commission decision on aid to Opel Europe, Memo/09/411, 23 September 2009. 
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were linked, for instance, to restrictions as to the location of the investment and to the 
retention of staff in specific areas of the single market.138 
The Communication made clear that this type of aid could only be offered as part of a 
national scheme, regardless of where they had their seat and could not favour national 
over non-national goods or services139 and would only be available to undertakings that 
are fundamentally financially “solid” and who have experienced difficulties in accessing 
credit after 1 July 2008 can benefit from this assistance.140 In addition, aid under the 
Temporary Framework cannot be combined with financial assistance deemed to fall 
outside the scope of Article 107.141 Member States are limited in the number options 
that they can choose from as regards the type of financial assistance that they can 
provide so that financial assistance remains “exceptional” and limited in its scope.142 To 
benefit from this “more lenient” regime, aid must be granted in the form of either a 
loan for up to €500,000 over two years, or of a state guarantee for bank loans granted at 
a special interest rate.143 State guarantees cannot exceed 80% of the value of the loan. 
“Preferential” rates are set at 15% if the recipient is a small/medium sized enterprise, or 
by the premium rate calculated by the Commission on the basis of the “safe harbour” 
clauses contained in the Communication.144  
“Cheap state loans” are another key feature of the Temporary Framework: states can 
grant “public or private loans” at preferential rates, calculated solely on the basis of 
central bank overnight rates and thus, significantly lower than “normal commercial 
rates”.145 This form of support appears particularly attractive, since it does not seem to 
be subject to the same “wage bill” limit as other forms of assistance: however, the 
Commission will be willing to supervise closely these measures to ensure that they are 
“strictly necessary” to overcome temporary liquidity problems.146  
In light of the above, it is argued that the 2008 Communications represented a “more 
lenient” regime vis-à-vis the one otherwise applicable in light of the R&R Guidelines, to 
respond to the immediate dangers of the financial crisis for the “real economy”147 and 
at the same time to maintain the integrity of the single market principles, including 
those of genuine competition.148 The Framework enshrines a clear preference for 
“general schemes”, as opposed to individual aid which should fulfil objective and 
138  See Speech given to the European Parliament, Plenary Session of 14 September 2009, SPEECH/09/388. 
139  Communication, cit. (fn. 135), para. 2.3; see also Soltesz, cit. (fn. 59), p. 109. 
140  Communication, cit. (fn. 135), para. 1.2. 
141  Id., para. 2.6; see also Soltesz, cit. (fn. 59), p. 110. 
142  Id., p. 114. 
143  Communication, cit. (fn. 135), para. 2.2; also Soltezs, cit. (fn. 59), pp. 109-110. 
144  Communication, cit. (fn. 120) ??? , para. 2.3. 
145  Id., para. 2.4; see Soltesz, cit. (fn. 59), p. 113. 
146  Soltesz, cit. (fn. 59), p. 113; also, mutatis mutandis, Marsden and Kokkoris, “The role of competition and 
state aid policy in financial and monetary law”, (2009) JIEL 875 at 888-889. 
147  Inter alia, Soltesz et al., cit. (fn. 59), pp. 109-110. 
148  Id., pp. 108-109. 
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transparent criteria.149 Some flexibility is allowed, for instance in respect to the 
availability of “cheap loans”.150 Nonetheless, it was criticised for the lack of flexibility 
on important aspects of the assistance it allowed. For instance, the Communication 
does not contain any indication of the criteria applicable to determine if the former are 
“sound but in difficulty” due to the credit squeeze. Also, it is clear that unlike under the 
R&R Guidelines, Member States are tightly constrained when it comes to both the 
nature of the assistance that they can grant and the amount for which the latter can be 
supplied, especially if it takes the form of guarantees.151 Also, there is no full legal 
certainty when it comes to granting these types of aid, especially because no formal 
“notification procedure” is provided.152  
It can be concluded that the Temporary Framework represented an ambitious attempt 
to address the shockwaves that the credit squeeze has had (and continues to have, even 
though its period of applicability has now expired) for the real economy. However, it is 
equally clear that on its own the Temporary Framework could not give a unitary answer 
to the challenges posed by the banking crisis to undertakings acting in wider economy: 
continued vigilance, especially so as to maintain the integrity of the single market, was 
exercised via the application of general state aid principles.  
3.3. Industrial restructuring in times of credit squeeze: the role of EU merger 
policy in the economic crisis 
The previous sections briefly analysed the approach adopted by the EU Commission in 
the supervision of state aid measures destined to “cushion” the economy from the 
consequences of the financial crisis and emphasised the continuing need to 
counterbalance the demands of managing the crisis and especially of preventing the 
credit squeeze from damaging fundamentally “solid” companies active in “real” sectors 
of the economy with maintaining the integrity of the single market. Similar concerns 
have guided the Commission in its approach to merger policy. In a speech given in 
March 2011, Commissioner Almunia observed that although the recession had resulted 
in a drop in mergers and acquisitions overall, the restructuring of certain economic 
sectors (such as, among others, energy and air transport) had continued as the 
expression of “defensive strategies” adopted by companies affected by the downturn 
and operating within the same market.153  
This trend toward the “consolidation” of potentially “ailing” businesses into stronger 
and bigger conglomerates is a well-known response to challenging times;154 however, it 
is also liable to have negative consequences for competition, such as an increase in 
149  Id., p. 110. 
150  Communication, cit. (fn. 135), para. 2.4. and 2.6; for commentary, inter alia, Soltesz, cit. (fn. 59), p. 113. 
151  Soltesz, cit. (fn. 59), p. 111-112; see also pp. 114-115. 
152  Id., p. 114. 
153  “Merger Regulation in the EU after 20 years: EU merger control has come of age”, speech given by 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes on 10 March 2011, SPEECH 11/166. 
154  See e.g. Lowe, “Competition policy and the economic crisis”, (2009) 5(2) CPI, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/cpi_5_2_2009_en.pdf, pp. 16 ff. 
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concentration and, as a consequence, greater ease of coordination, if not of tacit 
collusion, among competitors and the creation of artificial barriers to entry vis-à-vis 
potential competitors, who would be faced with powerful, often national 
incumbents.155  
Just as with state aid, the initially “passive” role adopted by the Commission at the 
onset of the financial crisis left it de facto open to the Member States to act unilaterally, 
and to “orchestrate” mergers designed to salvage ailing companies:156 but how can such 
action be justified if the merger in question clearly has a “Community dimension”? It 
should be emphasised that Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation, which authorises 
Member States to adopt “appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests”, so long 
as these measures remain compatible with the core principles of EU law and aim to 
address “non-competition concerns”.157 It was suggested that this provision could not 
be invoked to overcome the concerns for the integrity of competition raised by the 
Commission and, consequently to “by-pass” its decision to declare the merger 
incompatible with the common market solely for the purpose of, inter alia, maintaining 
the financial stability within one Member State.158  
Against this background, it may be argued that the concentration involving Lloyds TSB 
and Halifax/Bank of Scotland presented on the one hand, the OFT and the British 
authorities with the realisation of the magnitude of the challenges of the nearly looming 
downfall of a major bank, with clear risks for the overall economy. And on the other 
hand, it prompted the Commission to reflect on how it should react to the risks for the 
unity and integrity of the internal market.159 In the event the British authorities carved 
an additional “public policy exception” (i.e. the need to maintain financial stability) in 
their domestic law to justify the ministerial approval of the merger without it being 
necessary for the latter to be referred to the Competition Commission.160  
This decision, despite being probably the only way forward to address the predicament 
in which HBoS was, posed important questions for the Commission’s merger policy in 
tough times, when industrial consolidation had the potential of becoming more and 
more important as a “way out” of the crisis161 but could also favour “protectionist 
155  See inter alia Geradin et al., “Industrial policy and European Merger Control: a reassessment”, (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.co/abstract=1937586; see especially pp. 13-14 and 17-18; see also Marsden and 
Kokkoris, cit. (fn. 146), pp. 877-878. 
156  Geradin et al., cit. (fn. 1), pp. 17-18. 
157  See inter alia Pouncey and Bukovics, “Merger control, credit-crunch style”, (2009) 30(2) ECLR 67 at 70. 
158  Id., p. 71. 
159  Id., p. 72-73. 
160  See OFT report, 31 October 2008, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/ 
2008/LloydsTSB, and Conclusions of the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, available at: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-law/competition/mergers/mergers-with-a-public-interest/ 
maintaining-the-stability-of-the-uk-financial-system. For commentary see Marsden and Kokkoris, cit. (fn. 
146), pp. 879-880. 
161  Id., p. 880; see also Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), p. 8-9. 
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pushes”.162 It became especially clear that the Commission had to adopt a far more 
involved attitude to merger review.163 In 2009, the then Commissioner Neelie Kroes 
argued that the merger control framework and its established legal and economic 
concepts, such as the failing firm defence, was sufficiently flexible to provide principled 
and timely treatment for notified transactions, and at the same time respond to the 
challenges of financial instability.164  
Although the limited scope of this paper does not allow a detailed discussion of this 
defence, it is reminded that, according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the 
Commission can declare a prima facie anti-competitive merger compatible with the 
common market if one of the merging entities is a “failing firm”. This requirement is 
meant to be fulfilled if “the allegedly failing firm would in the near future be forced out 
of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another 
undertaking”; in addition, it must be shown that there would not be any “less anti-
competitive alternative purchase than the notified merger” and, finally, that without the 
concentration, “the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market”.165 At 
the heart of the defence is the need to satisfy the Commission that the market structure 
would deteriorate to the same extent regardless of whether the merger itself was 
allowed to go ahead.166 
   Despite being couched in relatively flexible terms, the defence has been notoriously 
difficult to invoke: merging parties have succeeded only in limited cases in which, for 
instance, there was a clear risk of bankruptcy or when an “alternative purchaser” could 
not be identified due to the overall state of the industry.167 It was added that since “a 
way of entering in a market is the acquisition/merger with an incumbent”, allowing 
undertakings to rely on the failing firm defence to seek to establish themselves on a 
new market may actually result in an increase in competition in the long run, since it 
would permit new entrants to rely on the customer base and infrastructure of an 
existing, albeit ailing, company, thus reducing, to a degree the impact of fixed and other 
start-up costs.168 This restrictive approach was however criticised on the ground that it 
may withhold approval from mergers that could limit the wider social and economic 
162  See e.g., mutatis mutandis, press release IP/08/1496 of 13 October 2008, available at: http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1496&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en.  
163  See e.g. Geradin et al., cit. (fn. 1), p. 17. 
164  Speech given at the IBA 13th Competition conference, 11 September 2009, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/385&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en. See also Lowe, cit. (fn. 154), pp. 16-19 
165  Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, [2004] OJ C31/5, para. 90. 
166  Id., para. 89; see e.g. Commission Decision 94/449/EEC, IV/m. 308, [1994] OJ L186/38, para. 71-73; for 
commentary, see e.g. Marsden et al., cit. (fn. 146), pp. 878. 
167  Commission decision of 11 July 2001, COMP/M.2314, [2002] L132/45, see especially para. 144-145 and 
147-148. 
168  Ibid. 
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aftershocks of industrial restructuring and could affect the decision of outsiders to 
attempt entry in the market.169  
Against this background, it is not surprising that Philip Lowe, then at the helm of DG 
Competition, was not entirely convinced of the possibility of authorising mergers in the 
banking and financial markets on this ground.170 He accepted in principle that 
concentrations involving “unsound” banks or financial services’ providers could fulfil 
the conditions of the defence in certain cases. However, he argued that the lack of 
reliable information as to the existence of, inter alia, an “alternative purchaser” for the 
failing business would be especially problematic not only due to the “sensitive” nature 
of the evidence and the risks that any delays in testing the commitments could create 
for the financial markets, but also due to the effects that a “collapse” of the market 
could have on any remaining competitors.171  
Another challenge for merger control is that posed by the need to provide a swift 
decision on proposed operations: while the merger control framework is famous for its 
tight time-limits, it soon became clear that, especially in respect to transactions 
involving banking and financial undertakings, time was of essence for the viability of 
the whole concentration. This issue became apparent, for instance, in the context of the 
takeover of Fortis, a Belgian bank whose stability had been thrown in question as a 
result of the financial crisis, on the part of BNP Paribas.172 The Commission cleared 
the transaction, subject to the obligation for the merged entity to divest its credit card 
business, for the purpose of allowing the entry of a new rival on that market segment, 
two weeks before the deadline.173 It was emphasised that the Commission had 
succeeded in delivering clearance of a key transaction for the viability of the Belgian 
financial market, within a tight time frame without “economising” in the scope and 
integrity of its appraisal.174 
It can be concluded that, albeit within the procedural and substantial limits imposed to 
it by the existing merger acquis the Commission sought to respond to the challenges 
arising from the crisis in a relatively flexible and proactive way. Whereas initially it had 
left domestic authorities with significant leeway as to the way in which they should deal 
with mergers concerning “failing undertakings”, especially after 2008 the Commission 
showed greater willingness to reconcile the integrity of the principles and approaches 
characterising merger assessment with the concrete demands of assessing and clearing 
M&A activity involving “problematic” firms.  
169  Kokkoris, “Failing firm defence in the European Union: a panacea for mergers?”, (2006) 27(9) ECLR 494 at 
507. 
170  Lowe, cit. (fn. 154),p. 18. 
171  Ibid.; see also Brouwer, “Horizontal mergers and efficiencies: theory and anti-trust practice”, (2008) 26(1) 
EJL & E 11, pp. 13-14; also inter alia, mutatis mutandis, Pouncey and Bukovics, “Merger control, credict-
crunch style”, (2009) 30(2) ECLR 67 at 71. 
172  Commission decision of 3 December 2008, case M.5384, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5384_20081203_20212_en.pdf.  
173  Press release of 3 December 2008, IP/08/1882. 
174  See e.g. Lowe, cit. (fn. 154), p. 18. 
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3.5. Commitments and remedies in the state aid and merger area: keeping an eye 
on the “winners”? 
The above section considered some of the issues arising from the application of the 
rules governing, respectively, state aid and merger control to the granting of financial 
assistance and to M&A activities taking place as a result of the impact of the economic 
crisis. Another key tool for the effectiveness of the Commission’s actions has been the 
practice of seeking ex-post commitments from the concerned undertakings as a 
condition for approval of Member States’ assistance or of the merger, with a view of 
countenancing any adverse effects on competition: at the core of its approach was a 
concern for minimising, as far as possible, any distortions of competition caused by, 
respectively, the giving of aid or the approval of “emergency” mergers.175  
In respect to state aid, the Commission aimed at ensuring that any undertaking that had 
received financial support would not be able to exploit the ensuing financial advantages 
to make access to the market more difficult for new entrants or to prevent existing 
rivals from expanding their market share. Thus, in the Aegon decision the Commission 
imposed on the recipient several structural and behavioural obligations, including a 
commitment to closing down significant areas of its business (especially those 
perceived as being the riskiest), to refraining from making further acquisitions until 
such time as it remained the beneficiary of the aid and to divest key assets.176 Aegon 
was also subjected to a ban on “price leadership” and could not give information 
concerning its business to rating agencies to limit its expansion potential for the time in 
which it benefitted from state aid.177 
Similar obligations were also imposed in the case of SNS Reeal.178 The Commission 
imposed on SNS Reeal an obligation to maintain a minimum level of solvency, so as to 
secure its long term viability and avoid the risk of market foreclosure.179 Individual 
institutions have often undertaken to divest key areas of their businesses, so that a 
“viable rival” would be allowed to emerge.180 Thus, in the Fortis Bank NV decision the 
Commission took the view that the divestiture on the part of the bank of key assets, 
such as 30 to 40% of its retail branches, was sufficient to minimise any adverse effects 
on competition.181 To avoid immediate increases in concentration the Commission 
175  Lowe, cit. (fn. 154), pp. 17-18. 
176  Commission decision of 17 August 2010, C(2010) 5740 final, especially para. 58-59 and 67-69. 
177  Id., para. 68, 70-73.  
178  See Press Releases IP/08/1951 of 11 December 2008 and IP/10/82 of 28 January 2010; Commission 
decision of 28 January 2010, C(2010)498 final. 
179  Commission decision, cit. (fn. 176), para. 78-81. See also, mutatis mutandis, the commitments imposed in 
respect to the aid given by the UK Government to the Lloyds Banking Group: press release IP/08/1496 of 
13 October 2008, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1496& 
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; letter to the Member State, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/228924/228924_928084_11_2.pdf, para. 12, 20 and 52. 
180  Id., para. 52. 
181  Commission decision of 3 December 2008, C(2008)8085, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-42-2008-NN-46-2008-NN-53A-2008-WLWL-EN-03.12.2008.pdf, para. 92-
93. 
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sought a further commitment from a third party (i.e. BNP Paribas) not to purchase 
these assets in the short/medium term.182  
A broadly similar approach to ex-post remedies was adopted also in the United 
Kingdom in the aftermath of the HBoS/Lloyds takeover. It may be reminded that, in 
its decision to refer the case to the Competition Commission, the OFT had taken the 
view that no “undertakings in lieu” could be considered but that it would have been 
more appropriate for the Commission itself to do so.183 However, after the ‘public 
interest’ intervention of the Secretary of State, allowing for the takeover to go ahead,184 
the merged entity indicated that it would divest a substantial part of its retail business so 
as to limit the distortions of competition on this market segment and thereby allow a 
new or existing rival to emerge and counterbalance its own economic strength.185 
Following the submission of bids on the part of a number of potential competitors, the 
Co-Op was chosen as the “preferred bidder” for more than 600 Lloyds and HBoS 
branches, thus acquiring around 7% of the UK current account market186 and creating 
the economic premises for the emergence of a “new challenger bank”.187  
The proactive and flexible use of remedies and commitments was also deployed to 
merger cases in the “real economy”. In Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines,188 for instance, the 
Commission cleared the notified transaction, which affected competition on key routes 
within continental Europe. It was recognised that the crisis affecting the aviation 
industry was likely to depress the incentive of airlines to enter the routes in question:189 
relieving “slot congestion” was therefore indispensable to maintain an open market not 
only in the short and medium term but would also in future, more florid times.190  
It is concluded that the financial crisis and especially its aftershocks on the “real 
economy” have challenged many of the “established” principles and legal and 
economic approached guiding the Commission’s approach to mergers and state aid, 
thus forcing it to adopt a more proactive stance to protect the openness, the rivalry and 
the overall integrity of the common market. However, the Commission’s central role in 
182  Id., para. 95-97. 
183  See OFT report, 31 October 2008, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/ 
2008/LloydsTSB, pp. 95-96. 
184  See Conclusions of the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, available at: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-law/competition/mergers/mergers-with-a-public-interest/ 
maintaining-the-stability-of-the-uk-financial-system.  
185  See report on ‘the way forward for Scotland banking, building society and financial services’ sector’, Scottish 
Parliament’s Committee on Economy, Energy and Tourism, para. 32-34; available at: 
http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/eet/reports-10/eer10-03-vol01.htm.  
186  See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17688731; see also http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
18898125.  
187  See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18898125.  
188  Commission decision of 28 August 2009, COMP/M.5440, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
mergers/cases/decisions/m5440_20090828_20600_en.pdf.  
189  Id., para. 386. 
190  Id., para. 388. See Commissioner Neelie Kroes, Press release of 28 August 2009, IP/09/1255. For 
commentary see e.g. Weitbrecht, cit. (fn. 7), at 279-280; also Lowe, cit. (fn. 154), p. 18. 
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the wider context of competition policy was challenged by the unfolding of the crisis. 
The next section will conclude by reflecting on the wider implications that dealing with 
these events have had on the Commission’s actual role as well as on the overall 
framework for the enforcement of EU competition law. 
4. BRUISED AND BATTERED? THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU COMPETITION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
The forgoing sections sought to provide a snapshot of some of the responses given by 
the tools of EU competition law to the challenges posed by the 2007 financial crisis and 
by its aftershocks for the “real economy”. It was illustrated how the EU Commission, 
after having been caught in some way “unawares” by the unfolding of the crisis, thus 
remaining passive, to some degree, to its demands, was soon able to “find its own 
voice”. At the heart of this response was a deeply felt need to maintain the unity and 
integrity of the internal market, even in the face of very dangerous and disquieting 
times. From the Banking Guidelines to the Temporary Framework regulating state aids 
in, respectively, the banking and financial sector and in the wider context of the “real 
economy” to the adoption of more flexible, quicker approaches to the scrutiny of 
mergers, the Commission sought to use its own array of policy and legal tools to the 
full. At the same time it was ready to “ditch” old style instruments, such as the 
application of the legal exception to “crisis cartels”. In light of these considerations, it 
may be argued that a picture which mixes continuity and change seems to have 
emerged: “established” tools have been deployed in a spirit of remarkable flexibility, 
substantive and procedural.  
Thus, having regard to the banking sector, the Commission derogated from the 
rigorous approach enshrined in the R&R Guidelines to provide a relatively more 
generous “assessment of state assistance to banks and financial institutions and at the 
same time to uphold key principles of market openness, transparency and non-
discrimination. Similarly, in the area of merger control, the Commission confirmed its 
commitment to a strong, scrupulous and, at the same time, “realistic” scrutiny, i.e. one 
inspired by principles of flexibility, expedition and ultimately aimed at protecting the 
integrity of the single market, especially vis-à-vis those Member States that may have 
been tempted to prop up “national champions”. 
Against this background, one could legitimately ask whether “all is well” in competition 
law and policy in times of crisis: and again, the answer should be inevitably more 
nuanced than just a straight positive or negative one. It is unquestionable that the initial 
phase of the crisis saw the Commission taking a back seat and, consequently, the 
Member States taking the lead in dealing with the “emergencies” occurring in their own 
jurisdictions. However, the risks that this passive role could have for the integrity of the 
common market and, perhaps more pragmatically, for the strength of its own 
leadership contributed to the Commission taking a proactive role in shaping the 
Member States’ policies. It is undeniable that many of the challenges created by this 
systemic economic and financial crisis remain: Member States may have “trouble-shot” 
relatively effectively when it came to salvage banks, but this came at the price of far 
more concentrated markets, in which entry remains difficult and the implementation of 
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divestiture and other remedies is far from complete. Other sectors, ranging from the 
automotive industry to aviation and other transport industries, also remain 
characterised by a more restricted pool of rivals and by the existence of several 
“alliances” and other loose cooperation arrangements.  
Thus, it is concluded that competition law comes out of the crisis largely intact but also 
“bruised” by the effects of the crisis. It is accepted that some of the outcomes of the 
agenda deployed for its “management” may be reversed overtime--e.g. via a careful 
policy of divestiture of assets or a gradual repayment of governmental funds and 
guarantees. However, it is equally clear that other effects may be more difficult to “wipe 
out”, such as the perceived difficulty for new entrants to challenge incumbents in key 
sectors, such as aviation. In many ways, the old adage “time heals all wounds” may help 
summing up what awaits EU competition policy in the post-crisis economic era. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that time is something which, due to the irreversible 
consequences of the crisis itself and of the responses to it for rivalry and market 
openness, is now in relatively short supply. Thus, it may be preferable to think about 
the future as something which is largely unwritten and unpredictable still, as well as 
confined in a relatively small horizon. 
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